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The demographic transition that swept the world in the course of the last century has
been identiﬁed as one of the prime forces in the transition from stagnation to growth. The
unprecedented increase in population growth during the early stages of industrialization was
ultimately reversed and the demographic transition brought about a signiﬁcant reduction
in fertility rates and population growth in various regions of the world, enabling economies
to convert a larger share of the fruits of factor accumulation and technological progress
into growth of income per capita. This paper examines various mechanisms that have been
proposed as possible triggers for the demographic transition, assessing their empirical validity,
and their potential role in the transition from stagnation to growth.
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01 Introduction
The transition from stagnation to growth and the associated phenomenon of the great divergence
have been the subject of an intensive research in the growth literature in recent years. The
inconsistency of exogenous and endogenous neoclassical growth models with some of the most
fundamental features of process of development, induced growth theorists to advance a uniﬁed
growth theory that captures in a single framework the epoch of Malthusian stagnation, the
contemporary era of sustained economic growth, and the fundamental driving forces of the
recent transition between these distinct regimes.
The understanding of the contemporary growth process is fragile and incomplete unless
growth theory would be based on proper micro-foundations that reﬂect the qualitative aspects
of the growth process and its central driving forces over most of human existence. Moreover, a
comprehensive understanding of the hurdles faced by less developed economies in reaching a state
of sustained economic growth would be futile unless the factors that prompted the transition of
the currently developed economies into a state of sustained economic growth would be identiﬁed
and their implications modiﬁed to account for the diﬀerences in the growth structure of less
developed economies in an interdependent world.
Uniﬁed growth theory, ﬁrst advanced by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), suggests that the
transition from stagnation to growth is an inevitable by-product of the inherent Malthusian
interaction between population and technology, and its ultimate impact on the demand for
human capital and thereby on the onset of the demographic transition. Variations in the timing
of the transition across countries and regions reﬂect initial diﬀerences in geographical factors
and historical accidents and their manifestation in variations in institutional, demographic, and
cultural factors, trade patterns, colonial status, and public policy.
The demographic transition that swept the world in the course of the last century has
been identiﬁed as one of the prime forces in the movement from an epoch of stagnation to a
state of sustained economic growth. It brought about a signiﬁcant reduction in fertility rates
and population growth in various regions of the world, enabling economies to convert a larger
share of the fruits of factor accumulation and technological progress into growth of income per
capita
This paper examines various mechanisms that have been proposed as possible triggers
1for the demographic transition, assessing their empirical validity, and their potential role in the
transition from stagnation to growth.
2 Historical Evidence
The evolution of economies over most of human history was marked by Malthusian stagnation.
Technological progress and population growth were miniscule by modern standards and the
average growth rate of income per capita in various regions of the world was even slower due to
the oﬀsetting eﬀect of population growth on the expansion of resources per capita. In the past
two centuries, in contrast, the pace of technological progress increased signiﬁcantly in association
with the process of industrialization. Various regions of the world economy departed from the
Malthusian trap and initially experienced a considerable rise in the growth rates of income per
capita and population. Unlike episodes of technological progress in the pre-Industrial Revolution
era that failed to generate sustained economic growth, the increasing role of human capital in
the production process in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution ultimately prompted a
demographic transition, liberating the gains in productivity from the counterbalancing eﬀects
of population growth. The decline in population growth and the associated advancement in
technological progress and human capital formation paved the way for the emergence of the
modern state of sustained economic growth.
The evolution of population growth in the world economy has been non-monotonic. The
growth of world population was sluggish during the Malthusian epoch, creeping at an average
annual rate of about 0.1% over the years 0-1820 (Maddison (2003)). The Western European
take-oﬀ along with that of the Western Oﬀshoots (i.e., United States, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand) brought about a sharp increase in population growth in these regions and consequently
in the world as a whole. The annual average rate of population growth in the world increased
gradually reaching 0.8% in the years 1870-1913. The delayed take-oﬀ of less developed regions
and the signiﬁcant increase in their income per capita generated a further gradual increase in
the rate of population growth in the world, despite the decline in population growth in Western
E u r o p ea n dt h eW e s t e r nO ﬀshoots, reaching a high level of 1.92% per year in the period 1950-
1973. Ultimately, however, the onset of the demographic transition in less developed economies
in the second half of the 20th century, reduced population growth to an average rate of about
21.63% per year in the 1973-1998 period.
The timing of the demographic transition diﬀered signiﬁcantly across regions. The re-
duction in population growth occurred in Western Europe, the Western Oﬀshoots, and Eastern
Europe towards the end of the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century, whereas
Latin America and Asia experienced a decline in the rate of population growth only in the last
decades of the 20th century. Africa’s population growth, in contrast, has been rising steadily,
although this pattern is likely to reverse in the near future due to the decline in total fertility
rate in this region since the 1980s.
The demographic transition in Western Europe occurred towards the turn of the 19th
century. A sharp reduction in fertility took place simultaneously in several countries in the
1870s, and resulted in a more than a 30% decline in fertility rates within a 50 year period. As
depicted in Figure 1, over the period 1875-1920, Crude Birth Rates declined by 44% in England,
37% in Germany, 32% in Sweden and Finland, and 26% in France, (where the decline in fertility
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Figure 1. The Decline in Fertility and Mortality in Western Europe:
Source: Andorka (1978)
The mortality decline preceded the decline in fertility rates in a large number of countries
in the world, with the notable exceptions of France and the United States. The decline in
mortality rates preceded the decline in fertility rates in Western European countries and it
1Coale and Treadway (1986) ﬁnd that a 10% decline in fertility rates was completed in 59% of all European
countries in the time period 1890-1920.
3began in England nearly 140 years prior to the decline in fertility and in Sweden and Finland
approximately 100 years prior to the decline in fertility. The decline in fertility during the
demographic transition outpaced the decline in mortality rates and brought about a decline in
the number of children who survived to their reproduction age (e.g., Kuzynski (1969)).
A similar sequence of events characterizes the pattern of mortality and fertility decline in
less developed regions. Total Fertility Rate over the period 1960-1999 plummeted from 6 to 2.7
in Latin America and from 6.14 to 3.14 in Asia. Even in Africa the Total Fertility Rate declined
moderately from 6.55 in 1960 to 5.0 in 1999. Moreover, a sharp decline in infant mortality rates
corresponded to the decline in fertility rates in many of the countries in these regions.
3 Assessment of Theories of the Demographic Transition
Theories of the demographic transition attempt to capture the determinants of the signiﬁcant
reduction in fertility rates and population growth that characterized the world in the past
century, enabling economies to convert an increasing share of the beneﬁts of factor accumulation
and technological progress into growth of output per capita via a reduction of the dilution of
the stock of capital and land, enhancement of investment in the human capital, and changes in
the age distribution of the population, temporarily increasing the size of the labor force relative
to the population as a whole.
3.1 The Decline in Infant and Child Mortality
The decline in infant and child mortality rates that preceded the decline in fertility rates in
many countries, with the notable exceptions of France and the US, has been demographers’
favorite explanation for the onset of the decline in fertility in the course of the demographic
transition. Nevertheless, it appears that this viewpoint is inconsistent with historical evidence.
While it is highly plausible that mortality rates were among the factors that aﬀected the level
of total fertility rates along human history, historical evidence does not lend credence to the
argument that the decline in mortality rates accounts for the reversal of the positive historical
trend between income and fertility.
As demonstrated in Figure 1, the mortality decline in Western Europe started nearly
a century prior to the decline in fertility and was associated initially with increasing fertility
rates in some countries and non-decreasing fertility rates in other countries. In particular, as
4demonstrated in Figure 2, the decline in mortality started in England in the 1730s and was
accompanied by a steady increase in fertility rates until 1820. The signiﬁcant rise in income per
capita in the Post-Malthusian Regime increased the desirable number of surviving oﬀspring and
thus, despite the decline in mortality rates, fertility increased signiﬁcantly so as to reach this
higher desirable level of surviving oﬀspring. The decline in fertility during the demographic
transition occurred in a period in which this pattern of increased income per capita (and its
potential positive eﬀect on fertility) was intensiﬁed, while the pattern of declining mortality (and
its adverse eﬀect on fertility) maintained the trend that existed in the 140 years that preceded
the demographic transition. Thus in the absence of the intervention of a third factor fertility
would have risen further.2 The reversal in the fertility patterns in England as well as other
Western European countries in the 1870s suggests therefore that the demographic transition
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Figure 2. Sources of the demographic Transition: England 1720-1930
Source: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981), Flora et al. (1983), Clark (2002), and Andorka (1978)
Furthermore, most relevant from an economic point of view is the cause of the reduction
in net fertility (i.e. the number of children reaching adulthood). The decline in the number
2One could argue that the decline in mortality was not internalized into the decision of households who had
diﬃculties separating a temporary decline from a permanent one. This argument is highly implausible given
the fact that mortality declined monotonically for nearly 140 years prior to the demographic transition. It
is inconceivable that six generations of household did not update information about mortality rates in their
immediate surrounding, while keeping the collective memories about mortality rates two centuries earlier.
3A quantitative analysis by Doepke (2005) supports the viewpoint that a decline in infant mortality rates was
not the trigger for the decline in net fertility during the demographic transition. based on data from England in
the time period 1861—1951. Similarly the insigniﬁcance of the mortality decline in the decline in fertility during
the demographic transition is established in the quantitative analysis of Fernandez-Vilaverde (2004).
5of surviving oﬀspring that was observed during the demographic transition is unlikely to follow
from mortality decline. Mortality decline would have led to a reduction in the number of
surviving oﬀspring if the following set implausible of conditions would be met:4 (i) There exists
as i g n i ﬁcant precautionary demand for children, i.e., individuals are signiﬁcantly risk averse with
respect to their expected number of surviving oﬀspring and they hold a buﬀer stock of children
in a high mortality environment. (Highly improbable from an evolutionary perspective). (ii)
Risk aversion with respect to consumption is smaller than risk aversion with respect to fertility.
(Evolutionary theory would suggest the opposite). (iii) Sequential fertility (i.e., replacement
of non-surviving children) is modest.5 (iv) Parental resources saved from the reduction in the
number of children that do not survive to adulthood do not lead to a rise in fertility.6
3.2 The Rise in the Level of Income Per Capita
The rise in income per capita prior to the demographic transition has led some researchers to
argue that the demographic transition was triggered by the rise in income per capita and its
asymmetric eﬀects on households income and on the opportunity cost of raising children. Becker
(1981) advances the argument that the decline in fertility in the course of the demographic tran-
sition is a by-product of the rise in income per capita that preceded the demographic transition.
He argues that the rise in income induced a fertility decline because the positive income eﬀect
on fertility that was generated by the rise in wages was dominated by the negative substitution
eﬀect that was brought about by the rising opportunity cost of children. Similarly, he argues
that the income elasticity with respect to child quality is greater than that with respect to
child quantity, and hence a rise in income led to a decline in fertility along with a rise in the
investment in each child.
This theory, however, is counter-factual.7 It suggests that the timing of the demographic
4Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) generates a reduction in net fertility in reaction to a decline in mortality assuming
(implicitly) that all these implausible conditions are satisﬁed. Eckstein et al. (1999) argue, based on conditions
(iii) and (iv) as well as speciﬁc interactions between mortality, wages, and the return to human capital, that
mortality decline played a role in the demographic transition in Sweden.
5Doepke (2005) shows that regardless of the degree of risk aversion, the feasibility of sequential fertility is
suﬃcient to preclude the decline in net fertility in reaction to a decline in mortality.
6An additional force that operates against the decline in the number of surviving oﬀspring is the physiological
constraint on the feasible number of birth per woman. If this constraint is binding for some households in a high
mortality regime, a reduction in mortality would operate towards an increase the number of surviving oﬀspring.
7For instance, a quantitative analysis of the demographic transition in England, conducted by Fernandez-
Vilaverde (2004), demonstrates that in contrast to Becker’s theory, a rise in income would have resulted in an
increase in fertility rates, rather than in the observed decline in fertility.
6transition across countries in similar stages of development would reﬂect diﬀerences in income
per capita. However, remarkably, as depicted in Figure 1, the decline in fertility occurred in
the same decade across Western European countries that diﬀered signiﬁcantly in their income
per capita. In 1870, on the eve of the demographic transition, England was the richest country
in the world, with a GDP per capita of $3191. In contrast, Germany that experienced the
decline in fertility in the same years as England, had in 1870 a GDP per capita of only $1821
(i.e., 57% of that of England). Sweden’s GDP per capita of $1664 in 1870 was 48% of that
of England, and Finland’s GDP per capita of $1140 in 1870 was only 36% of that of England,
but their demographic transitions occurred in the same decade as well.8 The simultaneity of
the demographic transition across Western European countries that diﬀered signiﬁcantly in their
income per capita suggests that the high level of income that was reached by Western Europeans
countries in the Post-Malthusian regime had a very limited role in the demographic transition.9
Interestingly, and consistent with Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002),
that underlined the critical role of the acceleration in technological progress and its eﬀect on
the demand for human capital in the demographic transition, despite the large diﬀerences in
the levels of income per capita across European countries that experiences the demographic
transition in the same time period, the growth rates of income per capita of these European
countries were rather similar during their demographic transition, ranging from 1.9% per year
over the period 1870-1913 in the UK, 2.12% in Norway, 2.17% in Sweden, to 2.87% in Germany.
3.3 The Rise in the Demand for Human Capital
3.3.1 The Main Mechanism
The gradual rise in the demand for human capital in the second phase of the Industrial Revolu-
tion (and in the process of industrialization of less developed economies) and its close association
with the timing of the demographic transitions, has led researchers to argue that the increasing
role of human capital in the production process induced households to increase investment in the
human capital of their oﬀspring, ultimately leading to the onset of the demographic transition.
Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), argue that the acceleration in the rate of technological
8Source: Maddison (2001). GDP per capita is measured in 1990 international dollars.
9Furthermore, cross-section evidence within countries suggest that the elasticity of the number of surviving
oﬀspring with respect to wage income was positive prior to the demographic transition (e.g., Clark (2003)), in
contrast to Becker’s argument that would require a hump-shaped relationship.
7progress gradually increased the demand for human capital in the second phase of the Industrial
Revolution, inducing parents to invest in the human capital of their oﬀspring. The increase
in the rate of technological progress and the associated increase in the demand for human
capital brought about two eﬀects on population growth. On the one hand, improved technology
eased households’ budget constraints and provided more resources for the quality as well as the
quantity of children. On the other hand, it induced a reallocation of these increased resources
toward child quality. In the early stages of the transition from the Malthusian regime, the eﬀect
of technological progress on parental income dominated, and the population growth rate as
well as the average quality increased. Ultimately, further increases in the rate of technological
progress that were stimulated by human capital accumulation induced a reduction in fertility
rates, generating a demographic transition in which the rate of population growth declined along
with an increase in the average level of education. Thus, consistent with historical evidence,
the theory suggests that prior to the demographic transition, population growth increased along
with investment in human capital, whereas the demographic transition brought about a decline
in population growth along with a further increase in human capital formation.10
Galor and Weil’s theory suggests that a universal rise in the demand for human capital
in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution and the simultaneous increase in educational
attainment across Western European countries generated the observed simultaneous onset of the
demographic transition across Western European countries that diﬀered signiﬁcantly in their
levels of income per capita. In particular, as depicted in Figure 2, the demographic transition in
England was associated with a signiﬁcant increase in the investment in child quality as reﬂected
by years of schooling.
Evidence about the evolution of the return to human capital over this period are scarce
and controversial. They do not indicate that the skill premium increased markedly in Europe
over the course of the 19th century (e.g., Clark 2003). One can argue that the lack of clear
evidence about the increase in the return to human capital over this period is an indication for
the absence of a signiﬁcant increase in the demand for human capital. This partial equilibrium
argument, however, is ﬂawed. The return to human capital is an equilibrium price that is
10Quantitative evidence provided by Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) is supportive of the role of the rise in the
demand for skilled labor (via technological progress in an industrial, skilled-intensive, sector that is faster than
that in an unskilled-intensive, agricultural sector) in the demographic transition in the US.
8aﬀected both by the demand and the supply of human capital. Technological progress in the
second phase of the Industrial Revolution brought about an increase in the demand for human
capital, and indeed, in the absence of a supply response, one would have expected an increase
in the return to human capital. However, the signiﬁcant increase in schooling that took place
in the 19th century, and in particular the introduction of public education that lowered the cost
of education, generated a signiﬁcant increase in the supply of educated workers. Some of this
supply response was a direct reaction of the increase in the demand for human capital, and thus
m a yo n l yo p e r a t et op a r t i a l l yo ﬀset the increase in the return to human capital. However, the
removal of the adverse eﬀect of credit constraints on the acquisition of human capital (e.g., Galor
and Zeira 1993), as reﬂected by the introduction of public education, generated an additional
force that increased the supply of educated labor and operated towards a reduction in the return
to human capital.11
3.3.2 Reinforcing Mechanisms
The Decline in Child Labor. The eﬀect of the rise in the demand for human capital on
the reduction in the desirable number of surviving oﬀspring was magniﬁed via its adverse eﬀect
on child labor. It gradually increased the wage diﬀerential between parental labor and child
labor inducing parents to reduce the number of their children and to further invest in their
quality (Hazan and Berdugo 2002). Moreover, the rise in the importance of human capital in
the production process induced industrialists to support education reforms (Galor and Moav
2003, 2004) and thus laws that abolish child labor (Doepke and Zilibotti 2003), triggering a
reduction in child labor and thus in fertility.12
T h eR i s ei nL i f eE x p e c t a n c y .The impact of the increase in the demand for human capital
on the decline in the desirable number of surviving oﬀspring may have been reinforced by the
rise in life expectancy. The decline in mortality rates in developed countries since the 18th
century and the recent decline in mortality rates in less developed countries corresponded to
11This argument is supported indirectly by contemporary evidence about a higher rate of returns to human
capital in less developed economies than in developed economies (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002). The
greater prevalence of credit markets imperfections and other barriers for the acquisition of skills in less developed
economies generated only a partial supply response to industrial demand for human capital, contributing to this
diﬀerential in the skill premium. The eﬀect of inequality in the presence of credit constraints in discussed in
Dahan and Tsiddon (1988).
12Doepke (2004) provides quantitative evidence that suggests that indeed, child labor law played an important
role in the demographic transition.
9a gradual increase in life expectancy. Life expectancy increased in Western Europe during the
19th and the 20th century from 36 in 1820 to 46 in 1900, 67 in 1950 and 78 in 1999, and in less
developed economies during the 20th century.
Despite the gradual rise in life expectancy prior to the demographic transition, investment
in human capital was rather insigniﬁcant as long as a technological demand for human capital
had not emerged. Similarly, the rise in life expectancy in less developed regions in the ﬁrst half
of the 20th century has not generated a signiﬁcant increase in education and a demographic
transition. The technologically based rise in the demand for human capital during the second
phase of the Industrial Revolution and the rise in the expected length of productive life has
increased the potential rate of return to investments in children’s human capital, and thus
reinforced and complemented the inducement for investment in education and the associated
reduction in fertility rates.13
Natural Selection and the Evolution of Preference for Oﬀspring’s Quality. The im-
pact of the increase in the demand for human capital on the decline in the desirable number
of surviving oﬀspring may have been magniﬁed by cultural or genetic evolution in the attitude
of individuals toward child quality. Galor and Moav (2002) propose that during the epoch of
Malthusian stagnation that characterized most of human existence, individuals with a higher
valuation for oﬀspring quality (in the context of the quantity-quality, survival strategies) gained
an evolutionary advantage and their representation in the population gradually increased. The
agricultural revolution facilitated the division of labor and fostered trade relationships across
individuals and communities, enhancing the complexity of human interaction and raising the
return to human capital. Moreover, the evolution of the human brain in the transition to Homo
sapiens and the complementarity between brain capacity and the reward for human capital has
increased the evolutionary optimal investment in the quality of oﬀspring. The distribution of
valuation for quality lagged behind the evolutionary optimal level and individuals with traits
of higher valuation for their oﬀspring’s quality generated higher income and, in the Malthu-
sian epoch when income was positively associated with aggregate resources allocated to child
rearing, a larger number of oﬀspring. Thus, the trait of higher valuation for quality gained the
evolutionary advantage, and the Malthusian pressure gradually increased the representation of
13See Galor and Weil (1999), Hazan and Zoabi (2004), Moav (2005) and Soares (2005).
10individuals whose preferences were biased towards child quality.
This mechanism is consistent with the observed gradual rise in literacy rates prior to the
Industrial Revolution. It suggests that the increase in the investment in human capital prior
to the Industrial Revolution was a reﬂection of changes in the composition of preference for
quality in the population that stimulated investment in human capital, prior to the increase in
the demand for human capital in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution.
This evolutionary process was reinforced by its interaction with economic forces. As the
fraction of individuals with high valuation for quality increased, technological progress intensi-
ﬁed, raising the rate of return to human capital. The increase in the rate of return to human
capital along with the increase in the bias towards quality in the population reinforced the sub-
stitution towards child quality, setting the stage for a more rapid decline in fertility along with
as i g n i ﬁcant increase in investment in human capital.
3.4 The Decline in the Gender Gap
The decline in the gender gap in the last two centuries is an alternative mechanism that could
have triggered a demographic transition and human capital formation. The rise in women’s
relative wages and women’s relative education in the last two centuries and its potential impact
on the rise in female labor force participation and the associated decline in fertility rates have
been the center of another theory of the demographic transition.14
A theory based upon the decline in the gender wage gap and the associated with a decline
in fertility was explored by Galor and Weil (1996, 1999). They argue that technological progress
and capital accumulation complemented mental-intensive tasks and substituted for physical-
intensive tasks in the industrial production process. In light of the comparative physiological
advantage of men in physical-intensive tasks and women in mental-intensive tasks, the demand
for women’s labor input gradually increased in the industrial sector, decreasing monotonically
the wage deferential between men and women. In early stages of industrialization, wages of
men and women increased, but the rise in female’s relative wages was insuﬃcient to induce a
signiﬁcant increase in women’s labor force participation. Fertility, therefore increased due to the
14The rise in women’s relative wages and literacy rates along with declining fertility rates has been observed
in a large number of developed and less developed economies. In particular, this pattern was observed in the
US during the period 1800-1930 (See, U.S. Bureau of the Census, (1975), Goldin (1990) and Hernandez (2000)).
Moreover, literacy rates among women in England grew from 76% of those among men in 1840 to about 100% in
1900 (Cipolla(1969)).
11income eﬀect that was generated by the rise in men’s absolute wages. 15 Ultimately, however,
the rise in women’s relative wages was suﬃcient to induce a signiﬁcant increase in labor force
participation. It increased the cost of child rearing proportionally more than households income,
generating a decline in fertility and a shift from stagnation to growth.16
3.5 Other Theories
The Old-Age Security Hypothesis. The old-age security hypothesis has been proposed as
an additional mechanism for the onset of the demographic transition. It suggests that in the
absence of capital markets that permit intertemporal lending and borrowing, children are assets
that permit parents to smooth consumption over their lifetime.17 The process of development
and the establishment of capital markets reduce this motivation for rearing children, contributing
to the demographic transition.
Although old-age support is a plausible element that may aﬀect the level of fertility, it
appears as a minor force. The importance of the decline in the role of children as assets in
the onset of the demographic transition is questionable. The rise in fertility rates prior to the
demographic transition, in a period of improvements in the credit markets, raises doubts about
the signiﬁcance of the mechanism. Furthermore, cross-section evidence in the pre-demographic
transition era indicates that wealthier individuals, that presumably had a better access to credit
markets, had a larger number of surviving oﬀspring (e.g., Lee 1987 and Clark 2003).18
Exogenous Shocks - Luck. Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) advance a theory
that emphasizes the role of a major exogenous shock in triggering the demographic transition,
underlying the role of luck in the determination of the relative timing of the demographic
transition across nations and the wealth of nations. They argue that a major shock shifted
15The U-shaped pattern of female labor force participation in the process of industrialization follows from the
coexistence of an industrial sector and a non-modern production sector that does not fully rival with child rearing.
Women’s marginal product in non-modern sector was not aﬀected by capital accumulation in the industrial sector,
while women’s potential wages in the modern sector increased. In the early process of industrialization, therefore,
capital accumulation increased labor productivity in the industrial sector, family income increased via men’s
wages, while female wages, based on the production of market goods in the home sector did not change. Fertility
increased due to the income eﬀect and female labor force participation fell. Once capital accumulation and
technological progress increases female relative wages suﬃciently, capital accumulation raised women’s relative
wages, inducing a rise in female labor force participation in the industrial sector and reducing fertility.
16Similarly, Lagerloef (2003b) argues that the process of development permitted a gradual improvement in the
relative level of female education, raising the opportunity cost of children and initiating a fertility decline and a
transition to sustained economic growth.
17See Caldwell (1976) for earlier studies and Boldrin and Jones (2002) for a recent quantitative analysis.
18Moreover, examples of species in nature in which oﬀspring support their parent in old age are very rare.
12economies from the low-output high-fertility steady-state equilibrium towards the high-output
low-fertility steady-state equilibrium, triggering a demographic transition. This theory suﬀers
from critical deﬁciencies in the micro-structure.19 Moreover, it generates predictions that are
inconsistent with the evidence. In particular, in contrast to existing evidence that shows that the
process of industrialization and the associated increase in income per capita was accompanied
by sharp increase in population growth, prior to their decline in the course of the demographic
transition, a major shock that would shift the economy from the basin of attraction of a high-
fertility to a low-fertility steady-state equilibrium would generate, counterfactually, a monotonic
decline in fertility rates along with a simultaneous rise in income per capita.
4 Concluding Remarks
The demographic transitions that swept the world in the course of the last century has been
identiﬁed as one of the prime forces in the transition from stagnation to growth. It brought
about signiﬁcant reduction in fertility rates and population growth in various regions of the
world, enabling economies to convert a larger share of the fruits of factor accumulation and
technological progress into growth of income per capita. Various mechanisms have been proposed
as possible triggers for the demographic transition, and thus as a catalyst in the transition from
stagnation to growth. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the increasing role of human
capital in the production process in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution was the central
force behind the demographic transition. Unlike episodes of technological progress in the pre-
Industrial Revolution era that failed to generate sustained economic growth, the onset of the
demographic transition liberated the gains in productivity from the counterbalancing eﬀects
of population growth paving the way for human capital formation and the emergence of the
modern state of sustained economic growth.
19Multiplicity of equilibria in their model is generated by the implausible assumption that the return to edu-
cation increases with the aggregate level of education in society. Moreover, their “Malthusian” steady-state has
none of the features of a Malthusian equilibrium: (a) in the absence of technological change population growth
rate is not at the reproduction level, (b) counter-factually population growth in their “Malthusian” steady-state
is higher than the that in the beginning of the demographic transition, (c) a small positive shock to income when
the economy is in the ”Malthusian” steady-state initially decreases fertility.
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